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Abstract
Johnston famously argued that the colors are, more or less inclusively speaking,
dispositions to cause color experiences by arguing that this view best accommodates
his five proposed core beliefs about color. Since then, Campbell, Kalderon, Gert,
Benbaji, and others, have all engaged with at least some of Johnston’s proposed core
beliefs in one way or another. Which propositions are core beliefs is ultimately an
empirical matter. We investigate whether Johnston’s proposed core beliefs are, in fact,
believed by assessing the agreement/disagreement of non-philosophers with them. Two
experiments are run each with large sample sizes, the second designed to address
criticisms of the first. We find that non-philosophers mostly agree with the proposed
core beliefs, but that they agree with some more than others.
1 Introduction
What is the nature of color? This question has been given numerous answers: colors are
micro-structural physical properties of objects (Kripke 1972; Jackson and Pargetter
1987); colors are physical dispositions to reflect light, a.k.a. reflectance dispositions
(Tye 2000; Byrne and Hilbert 2003, 2004); colors are appearance dispositions to cause
color experiences (McGinn 1983; Johnston 1992); colors are primitive or sui generis
properties (Yablo 1995; Chalmers 2006). How should we decide between these views?
Philosophers have appealed to intuitive truths, phenomenal truths (e.g. how colors
look), to common sense, and to scientific findings in physics and psychophysics.
Johnston’s well-known meta-methodology is to adjudicate between competing views
by examining which view best accommodates our core beliefs about color, where core
beliefs set conceptual limits on what counts as a color (1992). Core beliefs about color
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are beliefs that are widely held by the general population (the folk) such that if a
property is ever so inclusively a color, as opposed to just more or less inclusively a
color, then all the core beliefs about color are true of it.1 An ever so inclusive view is
just one that captures or is compatible with all our core beliefs, whereas a more or less
inclusive view fails to capture or be compatible with one or more of our core beliefs.
Johnston leaves it open exactly how inclusive we have to be in order to avoid changing
the subject matter.2
Johnston proposed five core beliefs and argued that ultimately an appearance
dispositional view to the effect that colors are dispositions to cause color experiences
best accommodates them. Since then, Yablo (1995), Campbell (2005), Kalderon
(2007), Gert (2008), Allen (2011), Benbaji (2016), and Roberts (2018) have all
engaged with at least some of Johnston’s proposed core beliefs. Although Johnston’s
list may not be exhaustive, it includes those core beliefs most salient to present debates
in the ontology of color. We present the list below using the color ‘canary yellow,’ as
Johnston does, but the core beliefs apply to all colors.
Paradigms. Some of what we take to be paradigms of canary yellow things (e.g.
some canaries) are canary yellow.
Explanation. The fact of a surface or volume or radiant source being canary yellow
sometimes causally explains our visual experience as of canary yellow things.
Unity. Thanks to its nature and the nature of the other determinate shades, canary
yellow, like the other shades, has its own unique place in the network of similarity,
difference and exclusion relations exhibited by the whole family of shades.
Availability. Justified belief about the canary yellowness of external things is
available simply on the basis of visual perception. That is, if external things are
canary yellow we are justified in believing this just on the basis of visual
perception and the beliefs which typically inform it.
Revelation. The intrinsic nature of canary yellow is fully revealed by a standard
visual experience as of a canary yellow thing.
Empirical methods would be useful for deciding whether any of these five propositions
are, in fact, core beliefs. Without an empirical investigation into people’s core beliefs,
we have only Johnston’s intuitions and those of his proponents to rely on. The
intuitions of philosophers alone provide insufficient reason. First, we should doubt
1 The way we understand the issue these beliefs need not be explicit but may be implicit. We leave it open
what exactly it means to have an implicit belief. However, we assume it means this at minimum: implicit
beliefs are those beliefs that cannot be openly recalled or stated but influence a person’s thoughts and actions.
2 As Johnston (1992) rejects a sharp boundary between the analytic and the synthetic, he holds that there is a
decent amount of vagueness regarding which beliefs are core and so constitutive of the subject matter. He
thinks that pragmatic concerns can be used to select certain beliefs as core vs. others. Thus, he thinks we can
have a view on color without having to accommodate every core belief or, more precisely, candidate core
belief. Nevertheless, ceteris paribus, the more core beliefs that a view can accommodate the stronger a claim it
has to be correct.
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whether highly-educated philosophers retain folk beliefs. Perhaps philosophers’ beliefs
have been tainted by theoretic considerations (Goldman 2007). Johnston (1992) when
discussing his core beliefs talks of the theoretic work of other philosophers (e.g. Russell
and Strawson). So, it is not difficult to imagine that Johnston’s beliefs may not be the
beliefs of ordinary people. Second, without independent reason to endorse the five
beliefs proposed by Johnston (or any others), opponents can just reject their content as
question begging. This is exactly how Benbaji (2016) responds to Johnston’s Revela-
tion. An empirical investigation can provide some independent justification.
According to Johnston, his proposed core beliefs play a significant role in debates
about the nature of color. Paradigms is relevant to the realist/irrealist debate.3 Irrealists
argue that external objects are not actually colored (Boghossian and Velleman 1989;
Hardin 1993, 2004; Maund 1995; Chalmers 2006). It has been debated whether
Irrealism can be a view on color ever so inclusively speaking (Stroud 2000). If
Paradigms is a core belief, the colors ever so inclusively speaking must exist. Para-
digms is relevant to the irrealist debate in another way if we assume that anything
which is a core belief is intuitive and/or common sense: if so, and Paradigms is a core
belief, there is an argument via intuition and/or common sense for realism. It is
probably in part because of an argument from intuition and/or common sense that
realism is the dominant position in philosophy. Of course, Paradigms, as well as
Johnston’s other core beliefs, do not have to be core beliefs per se to be common sense
or intuitive. If one balks at the idea that certain beliefs are such that they are constitutive
of a subject matter, one may prefer to think in terms of common sense. If one balks at
the idea that people have such complex beliefs about color, even implicitly, one may
prefer to think in terms of intuition.
Explanation, Unity, and Availability are relevant to debates between positions on
color which hold that they are lower-level physical properties (micro-structuralism and
reflectance physicalism) and positions which hold that they are higher-level properties
(appearance dispositionalism and primitivism). If Explanation is a core belief, whatever
the colors are, ever so inclusively (for simplicity, we will sometimes drop this quali-
fication entirely), they must causally explain our experiences of color. However,
the overdetermination argument suggests that only lower-level physical proper-
ties can causally explain our color experiences: any explanation provided by
higher-level properties is redundant (Kim 1993a, 1993b; Hardin 1993, p. 61).
There is a related reason why Explanation is relevant: if only science tells us
what causally explains our color experiences and Explanation is true, we must
look to the properties discussed in science if we are to find the colors. It may be this kind
of reasoning in part that motivates Johnston’s narrowing his search to exclude primitiv-
ism (1992, p. 224).
If Unity is a core belief, the various colors must, because of their natures, stand in the
appropriate relations of similarity, difference, and exclusion. Unity poses a special
problem for lower-level physical views. There are at least 14 features at the micro-
structural level that are sufficient to cause normal observers in normal conditions to
3 We note that Explanation, as phrased by Johnston, also implies that objects are colored. It could be phrased
as a conditional so as to avoid this implication and avoid overlap with Paradigms. The other core beliefs do not
clearly make any claims about objects being colored. Unity only speaks of the higher order properties of the
colors, which they could have regardless of being instantiated. Availability speaks of ‘justified belief’ not
‘justified true belief,’ and Revelation speaks of ‘visual experience,’ not ‘veridical visual experience.’
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have an experience as of an object being blue, for example (Nassau 1983, 1997).4
Assuming Explanation, the micro-structuralist should look to these properties to
determine what colors are, but it is unknown whether any of these properties can
accommodate Unity. There is a well-known argument that reflectance physicalism
cannot accommodate Unity (Hardin 1993, p. 66; Maund 1995, p. 126–133; Thompson
1995, p. 124; Pautz 2006): reflectances do not necessarily stand in the required
similarity relations, for upon examining the relevant reflectance curves (Pautz 2006),
no justified means to hold that Unity is true of them can be found (likewise for types of
reflectances).
If Availability is a core belief, this poses a problem for views on color that reduce
colors to properties for which perception does not provide justification. Johnston
(1992) points out that Unity and Availability taken together pose a problem for
lower-level physical views: if a lower-level physical view is adjusted to accommodate
Unity, it violates Availability (p. 238). Johnston’s argument runs thus: if the colors were
lower-level physical properties which accommodate Unity, then we could only know
that there were colors if we knew that there were lower-level physical properties which
accommodate Unity, but knowing this would require a sophisticated scientific investi-
gation (pp. 238–238). So, if Unity is true of lower-level physical colors, then these
colors cannot accommodate Availability. Arguably, Availability alone poses a problem
for lower-level physical views: via Leibniz’s law (if x = y, then x and y share all the
same properties) one can deduce that Availability is false for the colors if they are
lower-level physical properties, because we are not justified in believing objects have
lower-level physical properties based simply on visual perception (Jackson 2012).
Revelation is the purported core belief that especially favors a primitivist view of
color. Revelation states that the intrinsic nature of canary yellow is fully revealed by a
standard visual experience as of a canary yellow thing, but the colors being appearance
dispositions or physical properties is not revealed by a standard visual experience(s)
(Johnston 1992, p. 225). So, if Revelation is, in fact, a core belief, the colors are not
micro-structural, reflectance dispositions, or appearance dispositions (at least not ever
so inclusively speaking). Johnston, of course, believes that Revelation is a core belief.
He thinks that no view which satisfies Explanation can satisfy Revelation (p. 224). If
this is right, which purported core belief is empirically a better candidate is highly
relevant. Johnston favors Explanation over Revelation, but it is unclear whether this
decision is warranted. If Revelation is the better candidate, perhaps we should throw
out Explanation and adopt primitivism. If Explanation is a better candidate, perhaps we
should throw out Revelation and adopt a non-primitivist view on color, for example,
micro-structuralism. If they are both equally good candidates, this is important too, for
it shows that neither can be preferred. Given Johnston’s core belief meta-methodology
for adjudicating between competing views on color, empirical research could help to
decide what to do.
In this article, we empirically test Johnston’s proposed core beliefs by asking the folk
how much they agree with them. If a proposition is a core belief, then agreement with it
should be high. Core beliefs need to be widely believed by non-philosophers, and it is
4 These features comprise the following list: Incandescence, gas excitations, vibrations and rotations, transition
metal compounds, charge transfer, metals, pure semiconductors, doped semiconductors, color centers, disper-
sive refraction, scattering, interference, and diffraction.
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expected that if participants believe that a proposition is true, then they will agree with
it. Just how high this agreement must be is not something we will discuss, as any
number seems ad hoc. Rather, we will speak in terms of better or worse candidates for
core beliefs. What we find is that agreement is high for all five of Johnston’s proposed
core beliefs, but, importantly, that agreement is higher for some than others. Ceteris
paribus, the higher the agreement, the better a candidate for a core belief. We ran two
experiments with large participant numbers. The second was designed to improve on
arguable weaknesses of the first. We will present Experiment 1, then Experiment 2,
then discuss the results and their impact on the ontology of color. Our goal is not to
make a priori research in this area redundant but to add to it with our empirical findings.
For ease of exposition, this paper assumes that Johnston’s meta-methodology is worth
our time. This paper will make no attempts to argue for this meta-methodology. This is an
empirical paper testing whether Johnston’s core beliefs are widely believed. It is not an a
priori paper on philosophical methodology, and there is not the space for this debate either.
This said, one need not ascribe to Johnston’s method to recognize his five ‘core beliefs’ as
relevant to the ontology of color more generally. As we have mentioned, Paradigms, as well
as Johnston’s other core beliefs, do not have to be core beliefs per se to be common sense or
intuitive. In other words, it is possible to separate the propositions themselves from themeta-
methodology of core beliefs. So, there is no reason this paper cannot be viewed as providing
an empirical basis for an argument from common sense or intuition for views which better
accommodate the content of Johnston’s core beliefs. To save space, wewill mostly leave the
construction of these arguments to the reader.
2 Experiment 1
2.1 Method
Survey Development In preliminary surveys, we sought to design test items that could be
understood by non-philosophers while retaining content accuracy. The survey development
was ethically approved by the Humanities and Social Sciences Ethics Committee at the
University of Warwick (REF: 14/15–16:DR@W). Initially, survey items were chosen via
cooperative reflection between the co-authors. These items were refined iteratively through
conversations with available academics (Berit Brogaard, Keith Allen, and Derek Brown)
and lay people. Then, 30 participants were recruited using the University’s sona-system and
entered into a lottery draw for an Amazon gift voucher upon completion. Students at the
University of Warwick are actively recruited to join the sona-system. Faculty who wish to
join are able to do so, but the primary participant pool is university students.
For all items (test and control), participants were asked how well they understood
each on a scale from 1 = I don’t understand this statement at all to 10 = I completely
understand this statement. Participants were first presented with three control items in a
random order: ‘A circle is a type of shape,’ ‘A circle is a type of animal,’ and ‘A
spherical pain dissertates ubiquitously.’ Then, they were presented with the test items
also in a random order. For each test item, we also asked, ‘How could we make this
statement easier to understand?’
Based on responses (quantitative and qualitative), the authors then adjusted the test
items. After which, another 30 participants were recruited using the sona-system to
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complete the adjusted survey and entered into a lottery draw for an Amazon voucher
upon completion. As expected, these participants indicated higher understanding for the
first two control items (Modes = 10; Medians = 10) than they did for the third (Mo = 1,
Mdn = 2). Further, and meeting our standards for understanding, these participants
indicated high understanding of all the test items (Mo = 10; Mdn range = 8–10). We
thus considered the items ready for the main survey.
As should be clear from Table 1, the items we decided to use, partly as a result of the
aforementioned process, differed in various respects from those as stated by Johnston.
We rely mostly on the face validity of the items as evidence that they retain a high
degree of content accuracy. However, we will explicitly touch on two notable changes
between our items and Johnston’s. First, the notion of ‘paradigms’ is not explicitly
mentioned in our Paradigm items. Johnston defined Paradigms thus: ‘Some of what we
take to be paradigms of canary yellow things (e.g. some canaries) are canary yellow.’
This seems to be true if and only if some canaries are canary yellow, some oranges are
orange, some pumpkins are auburn orange, some grass is green, and so on. Thus, we
tested Paradigms by testing these individual statements. We did not explicitly bring up
the notion of ‘paradigms,’ because we think that what is philosophically most interest-
ing is whether people believe that some of the objects in question have the colors that
we often associate with them. Whether people think they are paradigms of the relevant
colors is another question entirely.
Second, we neither used the term ‘nature’ in the Unity items nor in any of the Revelation
items. In the survey development, it became apparent that this term was hard for non-
philosophers to understand. For the Unity items, we instead relied on the notion of necessity,
conveyed with the term ‘must’ (e.g. red must be more similar to orange than it is to green).
For the Revelation items, we instead relied on a few different terms for which participants
reported higher understanding. Revelation is the most obscure of Johnston’s core beliefs,
with disagreement regarding its correct expression (e.g. see Roberts 2018). As such, there is
no definitive statement of this core belief, and so we only intended to capture Revelation as a
somewhat amorphous and imprecise notion. Talk of ‘complete understanding,’ used in the
first Revelation item, comes from Gert’s version of Revelation (2008). The idea of ‘red’s
intrinsic features,’ used in the second Revelation item, is prima facie very close to the idea of
‘red’s intrinsic nature,’ used by Johnston. The last item, ‘When we look at a red object, we
perceive the characteristic of the object that is red,’ was used to capture a central aspect of
Revelation simply: that the metaphysical identity of red is available to perception. This
formulation is clearly perceptual and similar to that in Roberts (2018): ‘The colors as we see
them in perception are the intrinsic natures of the colors’ (i.e. what they are metaphysically).
The results for each item are presented in Appendix A and so one can exclude items at one’s
discretion if desired.
Participants In total, 333 participants completed the main survey via the University of
Warwick’s sona-system. This study was ethically approved by the Humanities and
Social Sciences Ethics Committee at the University of Warwick (REF: 20/15–
16:DR@W). Participants were entered into a new lottery draw for a chance to win
an Amazon gift voucher. The participants did not include any that were used in the
survey’s development. We continued recruitment until 300 participants met our inclu-
sion criteria. The 33 additional participants were removed for the following reasons: 16
had philosophical training, and 17 did not respond appropriately to the control items
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(see the section, ‘Procedure’) (5 for control item 1, and 12 for control item 2). Of the
remaining 300 participants, 200 were Female and the median age was 20 years (IQR =
19–22). We also collected details about the native language of participants. 164
identified as native English speakers. Of the remaining 136, 32 had a native language
from a country in the European Union, 101 from a non-European Union country, and 3
did not say.
Table 1 Items (test and control) for Experiment 1
Paradigms
The program randomly selects one item from each of the three columns below.
P1 P2 P3
- Some tomatoes are red. - Some pumpkins are auburn orange. - Some grass is green
- Some lipstick is scarlet red. - Some bananas are yellow. - Some trees’ leaves are forest green.
- Some oranges are orange. - Some canaries are canary yellow. - Sometimes the sky is blue.
- Some sapphires are sapphire blue.
Explanation
The program randomly selects one of ten colors to complete the sentence.
E1. A liquid being ___ at least sometimes causally explains why it looks ___.
E2. A surface being ___ at least sometimes causally explains why it looks ___.
E3. A light bulb being ___ at least sometimes causally explains why it looks ___.
Unity
The program randomly selects one of the ten colors along with its color complements to complete the
sentence.
U1. ___ must be more similar to ___ than it is to ___.
U2. ___ must be more different from ___ than it is from ___.
U3. If something is entirely ___, then it cannot at the same time be entirely ___
Availability
The program randomly selects one of the ten colors to complete the sentence.
A1. When one looks at a(n) ___ car, one is normally justified in believing that the car is ___.
A2. One’s belief that something is ___ can normally be justified without scientific investigation.
A3. Normally, we have good reason to believe that a coffee mug is ___ based just on seeing the coffee mug.
Revelation
The program randomly selects one of the ten colors to complete the sentence.
R1. A complete understanding of what ___ is can be had by seeing a(n) ___ thing, like a(n) ___ dress.
R2. When one sees a(n) ___ object, one sees ___‘s intrinsic features.
R3. When we look at a(n) ___ object, we perceive the characteristic of the object that is ___
Control items
C1. A circle is a type of shape.
C2. A circle is a type of animal.
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That these participants were all recruited through Warwick’s sona-system is a limitation.
The sample mainly included young adults who were students of one British University.
Experiment 2 uses a different demographic pool by recruiting participants via United States
based Amazon Mechanical Turk and includes a wider range of ages (see Sect. 3). Future
research could include a more diverse range of peoples and cultures than either of our two
studies (see Sects. 3 and 4.). Although Experiment 1 did include participants with a range of
native languages, they were not selected in their home countries, and those who chose to
attend a British University may not be representative of their home populations.
Materials The survey was created and administered online using Qualtrics software,
version 2015. The survey typically took between 5 and 6 min to complete (Mdn =
328 s, IQR = 249–445). All analyses were performed using IBM SPSS version 22.
Procedure Participants were asked how much they agreed with 3 test items for each
core belief on a 10-point Likert scale with only end points indicated (1 = strongly
disagree and 10 = strongly agree). To ensure that specific colors would not confound
the experiment, 10 versions of each test item were created, using these fine and coarse-
grain colors: red, orange, yellow, green, blue, scarlet red, auburn orange, canary yellow,
forest green, and sapphire blue. (We did not choose colors that were similar in hue,
because it was important that participants differentiate between the colors chosen: if
they did not, this might affect their responses. So, as a first test of Unity, we chose to
look at colors that were not close in color space; if we did not find Unity for these
colors, it is unlikely we would find it for more similar colors.) For Paradigms, 10
separate items were created and divided into 3 groups, and the survey software
randomly selected one item from each group to show each participant (see Table 1).
For the other core beliefs, 10 versions of each item were created, and the survey
software randomly selected one version of each item to show each participant (Table 1).
Every participant responded to two control items using the same Likert scale as
before (see Table 1). The purpose of these control items was to remove those partic-
ipants who did not pay enough attention, were unable to do/understand the task, or
demonstrated a high acquiescence bias (agreed no matter the content). The first control
item read, ‘A circle is a type of shape.’ Participants who were paying attention and were
able to do/understand the task should agree with this item. Hence, those who responded
5 or below were removed from the analyses. The second control item read, ‘A circle is
a type of animal.’Unbiased participants who were paying attention and were able to do/
understand the task should disagree with this item. Thus, those participants who
responded 6 or above were removed from the analyses. We chose these cut-points
for this reason: as we used a 10-point Likert scale, 5 and below can be taken to indicate
some degree of disagreement and 6 and above can be taken to indicate some degree of
agreement. These cut-points are the same cut-points we use in our results section to
designate whether participants indicate some degree of agreement with each core-
belief. After indicating how much they agreed with all the items in Table 1, demo-
graphic questions were asked.5
5 We collected the following demographics: Gender, Age, Experience in Academic Philosophy (None, Current
undergraduate, Graduated undergraduate, Current postgraduate, Graduated postgraduate) and Native Lan-
guage (Free-text).
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2.2 Results
Comparing Core Beliefs Composite scores for each core belief (an average of the three
items) were compared using descriptive statistics and tests. As there are no a priori
hypotheses to guide the analyses in this article, the significance level was set to a
conservative 0.005 (rather than the conventional 0.05).6 To allow readers who wish to
more liberally interpret differences to do so, exact p-values are given where results are
not deemed significant.
Descriptively, participants expressed the strongest agreement with Paradigms
(Mdn = 9.0, with 94% expressing an agreement of 6 or above). This was followed by
Unity (Mdn = 8.0; 87%), Availability (Mdn = 7.3; 82%), Revelation (Mdn = 7.0; 78%),
and finally Explanation (Mdn = 6.7; 66%) (see Fig. 1). The medians for all items and
the percent who answered 6 or higher for the 300 participants are given in Appendix A.
Friedman’s test, a non-parametric alternative to the repeated measures ANOVA, was
used to compare the composite scores for each core belief. This test was significant,
χ2(4) = 262.70, p < 0.001. Post hoc analyses were conducted to see where the
differences were. The difference between most core beliefs was significant (p’s <
0.001) but not the difference between Availability and Revelation (p = 0.006), and
Explanation and Revelation (p = 0.03). Recall that Revelation especially favors a
primitivist view and Explanation is thought to be an issue for primitivism. Lower-
level physical views struggle with Availability and Unity.
Fine Versus Coarse-Grain Colors To compare participants’ responses to fine and coarse-
grain colors, Mann-whitney U tests were performed for each of the 15 items. For
completeness, the p value of each test is given here in the order of the items in Table 1
(e.g. P1, P2, then P3).
Paradigm: p’s = 0.54, <0.001, and 0.01.
Explaination: p’s = 0.63, 0.47, and 0.37.
Unity: p’s = 0.11, 0.50, and 0.57.
Avalibility: p’s = 0.01, 0.87, and 0.14.
Revelation: p’s = 0.11, 0.37, and 0.72.
The only item’s p value that fell below 0.005 was Paradigms 2 (Z = 6.24, p < 0.001).
For this item, more people agreed with the coarse-grain version (involving yellow) than
the with the fine-grain versions (involving auburn orange and canary yellow) (Mdn’s =
10 v. 8). Thus, while agreement is very high for all the Paradigm items, it might be that
folk Paradigm beliefs regarding some coarse-grain colors are higher than for some fine-
grain colors. However, the reader should not make much of this finding, as it was not
stable for Paradigms generally.
6 The p value needed for significance is often adjusted when multiple tests are performed with no a priori
hypothesis(es). This is done to reduce the chance of a type I error. However, by decreasing the chance of a type
1 error, one also increases the chance of a type 2 error. Commonly, levels of significance are adjusted
according to the Bonferroni correction (i.e., 0.05/[the number of tests]), but when the number of tests is high
this correction can be overly conservative. So, as we ran many tests, the Bonferroni correction was avoided;
rather, the p value needed to obtain significance was set universally to a conservative 0.005 (Armstrong 2014).
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3 Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was conducted to address four arguable weaknesses of Experiment 1.
These weaknesses involve the participant population and the survey design. We now
discuss these weaknesses and how they were addressed. We then will look at the
methods and results.
Participant Population The participants in Experiment 1 were recruited over the
University of Warwick’s sona-system. Although our sample included a range of native
languages, it was also comprised of mostly young adults attending the University of
Warwick in the United Kingdom. Whether the results generalize to different popula-
tions is an open question. Experiment 2 uses a different demographic pool by recruiting
participants via Amazon Mechanical Turk (a US based service with residents from all
over the country) and includes a much wider range of ages. Future research could look
at a more diverse range of peoples and cultures (see ‘three limitations’ in Sect. 4).
Survey Design: Unity Items An arguable weakness of Experiment 1’s survey design is
that the simple Unity 1 and 2 items used in it were, because of their simplicity,
ambiguous as to whether they were about the colors’ hue, saturation, or brightness.
For example, a Unity 1 item read merely, ‘red must be more similar to orange than it is
to green.’ Participants might have disagreed with this to express that red need not be
more similar in every respect. To address this weakness, the original Unity 1 and 2
items were altered for Experiment 2 by placing the following clause in front of them:
‘With respect to its hue (as opposed to how saturated or bright it is).’ The remaining
items from Experiment 1 were unaltered for Experiment 2.
Survey Design: Likert Scale Another arguable weakness of Experiment 1’s survey
design is that the Likert scale response options in it were only labeled at the end points:
1 = strongly disagree and 10 = strongly agree. As a result, it may not have been obvious
to participants that a response of 5 indicates disagreement and a response of 6 indicates
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Paradigms Explanation Unity Availability Revelation
M
e
d
ia
n
Core-Belief
Fig. 1 Experiment 1 medians of the composite scores for each core belief
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agreement. To address this arguable weakness, in Experiment 2 every Likert point was
labeled: 1 = completely disagree, 2 = strongly disagree, 3 = disagree, 4 =moderately
disagree, 5 = slightly disagree, 6 = slightly agree, 7 = moderately agree, 8 = agree, 9 =
strongly agree, and 10 = completely agree. Thus, in Experiment 2, unlike in Experiment
1, it should be obvious to participants that a response of 5 indicates some level of
disagreement, and that a response of 6 indicates some level of agreement.
Survey Design: Acquiescence Bias A final, and perhaps the most significant, potential
weakness of Experiment 1’s survey design is that participants’ agreement may have
been tainted by an acquiescence bias: an effect wherein participants tend to agree with
any item regardless of its content (Podsakoff et al. 2003). While the attention check
item, ‘a circle is a type of animal,’ was designed to remove those who displayed a
strong acquiescence bias, this item was so obvious it might not have tapped into the
acquiescence bias effectively. To address this, in Experiment 2, 15 new test items were
created that were logical negations of the original 15 (Swain et al. 2008). For example,
in addition to the original item, ‘Some tomatoes are red,’ Experiment 2 included its
logical negation: ‘No tomatoes are red.’ Participants who agree with an original item
and who disagree to the same degree with its negation have not displayed an acquies-
cence bias. Participants in Experiment 2, responded to both the 15 original and the new
15 negation items.
Negation items were not used in Experiment 1, because past research suggests that
negatively worded items may confuse participants and so make surveys less reliable
(Sonderen et al. 2013). We thought this a good reason to avoid the complication.
However, other researchers believe that the careful inclusion of negation items en-
hances participants’ attention to and comprehension of all the items (Weijters and
Baumgartner 2012). As Experiment 1 already provided data without negation items,
we carefully included them in Experiment 2. Thus, the reader can see the results of two
similar surveys, one with and one without negation items.
3.1 Method
Participants In total, 327 participants were recruited and completed the survey via
Amazon M(echanical) Turk. This study was ethically approved by the Humanities and
Social Sciences Ethics Committee at the University of Warwick (REF: 46/16–
17:DR@W). As is common practice when using M Turk, participants were at least
required to have a US high school diploma and an assignment approval rate of 95%.
Participants who passed the control items and entered the correct code (given to them at
the end of the survey) into M Turk received a 0.50 USD payment. Twenty-seven
participants’ responses were removed for the following two reasons: 20 had philosoph-
ical training, and 7 did not respond appropriately to the control items (2 for control item
1, and 5 for control item 2). Of the remaining 300 participants, 151 were female and the
median age was 35 years (IQR = 29 to 54). As Amazon M Turk requires a US bank
account, almost all participants were native English speakers (295 of the 300). So,
Experiment 1 had a demographic advantage of including a more diverse range of native
languages, but Experiment 2 had an advantage in having a more diverse range
of ages. The participants gathered from M Turk were obviously also not all from one
British University.
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Materials The survey was created and administered online using Qualtrics software,
version 2015. It typically took participants between 5 and 10 min to complete (Mdn =
439 s, IQR = 332.5–602.5). All analyses were performed using IBM SPSS version 22.
Procedure Participants were asked how much they agree with the 15 original and 15
negation items, using a 10-point Likert scale where each point was designated with a
label from completely disagree to completely agree. As in Experiment 1, the order of
the items was randomized. All the negation items used in Experiment 2 are in Table 2.
In addition to the original and negation items, every participant responded to the
same two control items as in Experiment 1, using the new response options. If a
participant answered one of these control items incorrectly, they were immediately sent
to the end of the survey and did not receive payment. Participants were told that
payment depended on answering the control items correctly on the consent page. After
indicating how much they agreed with all the items, participants were asked the same
demographic questions as in Experiment 1.
3.2 Results
Comparing Core Beliefs Composite scores for each core belief (the average of the three
original items and the three negation items reverse-scored, so, for example, a 1 reversed
scored would become a 10) were compared using descriptive statistics and tests.
Descriptively, participants expressed the strongest agreement with Paradigms (Mdn=
9.7, with 100% expressing an agreement of 6 or above). This was followed by Availability
(Mdn = 8.2; 91%), Unity (Mdn = 7.3; 90%), Revelation (Mdn = 7.2; 79%), and finally
Explanation (Mdn = 6.3; 59%) (see Fig. 2). Notably, compared to Experiment 1, the order
of Unity and Availability switched. This could be due to the population, adjustments to the
unity items, adjustments to the Likert scale, and/or due to the inclusion of negation items.We
do not have the means to parse this out. The reader should bear in mind that agreement for
bothUnity andAvailabilitywas high for both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2. Themedians
for all items and the percent who answered 6 or higher for the 300 participants is given in
Appendix A (without reverse scoring).
Friedman’s test was used to compare the composite scores for each core belief. This
test was significant, χ2(4) = 573.93, p < 0.001. Post hoc analyses were conducted to see
where the differences lay. The differences between all core beliefs were significant (p’s
< 0.003). This contrasts with Experiment 1, where Revelation and Availability were not
significantly different nor Revelation and Explanation. We prefer not to speculate as to
why. The differences could be due to some of or all of the differences between
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2.
It is good to remind oneself when considering these results of the general relationships
that the core beliefs have with the different views on color. Paradigms is problematic for
irrealist views according towhich external objects are not colored. Explanation is considered
problematic for higher-level views (appearance dispositionalism and primitivism). Avail-
ability and Unity are considered problematic for lower-level physical views (micro-struc-
turalism and reflectance physicalism). Revelation is the core belief particularly favorable for
primitivism. We will look at these relationships in more depth in the discussion and just
mention them here for ease of reference.
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Fine Versus Coarse-Grain Colors To compare participants’ responses to fine and coarse-
grain colors, Mann-whitney U tests were performed for each of the 30 items. For
completeness, the p value of each test is given here for the original and then the
negation items in order (e.g. for the Paradigm items, the p-values are given for P1, P2,
P3, then P1.neg, P2.neg, and P3.neg).
Paradigm: p’s = 0.07, 0.001, <0.001, 0.07, <0.001, and 0.001.
Explanation: p’s = 0.43, 0.47, and 0.69, 0.93, 0.55, and 0.31.
Table 2 Negation items for experiment 2
Negation Paradigms
The program randomly selects one item from each of the three columns below.
P1.neg P2.neg P3.neg
- No tomatoes are red. - No pumpkins are auburn orange. - No grass is green
- No lipstick is scarlet red. - No bananas are yellow. - No trees’ leaves are forest green.
- No oranges are orange. - No canaries are canary yellow. - The sky is never blue.
- No sapphires are sapphire blue.
Negation Explanation
The program randomly selects one of ten colors to complete the sentence.
E1.neg A liquid being ___ never causally explains why it looks ___.
E2.neg A surface being ___ never causally explains why it looks ___.
E3.neg A light bulb being ___ never causally explains why it looks ___.
Negation Unity
The program randomly selects one of the ten colors along with its color complements to complete the
sentence.
U1.neg With respect to its hue (as opposed to how saturated or bright it is), ___ does not have to be more
similar to ___ than it is to ___.
U2.neg With respect to its hue (as opposed to how saturated or bright it is), ___ does not have to be more
different from ___ than it is from ___.
U3.neg If something is entirely ___, then it can at the same time be entirely ___.
Negation Availability
The program randomly selects one of the ten colors to complete the sentence.
A1.neg When one looks at a ___ car, one is not normally justified in believing that the car is ___.
A2.neg One’s belief that something is ___ cannot normally be justified without scientific investigation.
A3.neg We do not normally have good reason to believe that a coffee mug is ___ based just on seeing the
coffee mug.
Negation Revelation
The program randomly selects one of the ten colors to complete the sentence.
R1.neg A complete understanding of what ___ is cannot be had by seeing a ___ thing, like a ___ dress.
R2.neg When one sees a(n) ___ object, one does not see ___‘s intrinsic features.
R3.neg When we look at a(n) ___ object, we do not perceive the characteristic of the object that is ___.
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Unity: p’s = 0.07, 0.28, 0.22, 0.23, 0.24, and 0.25.
Availability: p’s = 0.001, 0.02, 0.88, 0.30, 0.87, and 0.68.
Revelation: p’s = 0.26, 0.07, 0.57, 0.18, 0.37, and 0.98.
As with Experiment 1, differences between fine and coarse-grain colors emerged for
the second Paradigm item: yellow (Mdn = 10) was rated higher than auburn orange and
canary yellow (Mdn = 8; P2: Z > 3.47, p = 0.001). A similar difference emerged for this
item’s negation: negation yellow (Mdn = 1) was rated lower than negation auburn
orange and canary yellow (Mdn = 1; P2.neg: Z > 6.45, p < 0.001). An additional differ-
ence was found for the third Paradigm item: green and blue (Mdn = 10) were rated
higher than forest green and saphire blue (Mdn = 10; P3: Z > 3.72, p < 0.001). A similar
difference emerged for this item’s negation: negation green and blue (Mdn = 1) were
rated lower than negation forest green and sapphire blue (Mdn = 1; P3.neg: Z > 3.34,
p = 0.001). Ceiling and floor effects are likely driving these differences.7
The only other item for which a difference between fine and coarse-grain colors was
found was the first, original Availability item (A1: Z = 3.43, p = 0.001) with the median
score for fine-grain being 9, and the median score for course-grain being 10. Why
participants would treat fine and coarse-grain colors differnetly for just one Availability
item is curious; however, as this result does not hold true for both Experiments 1 and 2
nor for the relevant negation item, we do not want to overinterpret the result.
4 Discussion
Summary of General Results Our results for both Experiments 1 and 2 suggest that
people generally agree with all five of Johnston’s core beliefs but, importantly, with some
7 A ceiling (or floor effect) occurs in surveys when most participants respond near the top (or bottom) of the
scale for a particular item. In so doing, the variability around that item is very low and atypical outliers have an
opportunity to cause differences to appear that would have otherwise not appeared.
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more than others. Looking at Experiment 2, which is the more rigorous, we see that
participants expressed the strongest agreement with Paradigms, followed by Availability,
Unity, Revelation, and finally Explanation. A notable difference between Experiment 1
and 2 is that for the former Unity was agreed with more than Availability. We cannot
speculate much as to why. Future research could investigate if the difference was due to
the different participant pools or something else by keeping everything the same between
two numerically different experiments run with the different pools. Possibly, the new
Unity items were agreed with less than Availability, because they were less well under-
stood. However, Availability agreement was notably higher in Experiment 2 (Exp. 1:
Mdn = 7.3; 82% vs. Exp. 2: Mdn = 8.2; 91%), whereas Unity agreement was, in fact,
rather similar (Mdn = 8.0; 87% vs. Mdn = 7.3; 90%).
More relevantly, Experiments 1 and 2 agree in more ways than they disagree, and so
can be seen largely to be complimentary. Both Experiments 1 and 2 agree that
Explanation is descriptively the least agreed with and Paradigms the most. Both
Experiments 1 and 2 agree that Revelation is descriptively the second least agreed
with but still generally agreed with. Both Experiments 1 and 2 agree that Unity and
Availability are in the middle of the other core beliefs in terms of participant agreement.
Statistically, Experiments 1 and 2 agree on a lot as well, for example, that Explanation
is agreed with less than Unity and Availability, that Paradigms is agreed with more than
Explanation, and that Unity is agreed with more than Revelation.
Three Limitations 1. Our experiments are based on the presupposition that if a prop-
osition is a candidate for being a core belief, agreement should be high, and that the
higher the agreement, the better a candidate, ceteris paribus.8 There is a limitation to
testing core beliefs in this way: high agreement alone does not entail that a proposition
is a core belief. To avoid this limitation, an alternative method might use counterfactual
scenarios. While such a method could yield interesting results, we chose not to use it,
for it would have required more conceptually complicated items and so would decrease
the number of items we could realistically expect a sizable number of non-philosophers
to answer. We wanted to develop a survey that could comprehensively assess a sizable
number of non-philosophers’ responses with respect to all five of Johnston’s core
beliefs, so that we could compare participant agreement across them. We encourage
researchers to employ many methods, including psycholinguistic methods (Fischer and
Engelhardt 2016, 2017, 2019), because the triangulation of data from different methods
will certainly yield a richer understanding of folk core beliefs about color.
2. Our experiments focused on participants in the United States and the United Kingdom.
One area that experimental philosophy has investigated is the cross-cultural stability of
philosophically relevant concepts (Weinberg et al. 2001; Nagel et al. 2013; Machery et al.
2004). If people’s concepts diverge between cultures that might call into question the
methods of philosophy. Specifically, it might call into question whether we can say what
the necessary and sufficient conditions are for a philosophically relevant concept. If they are
stable, that might reinforce the value of traditional philosophical methods. No cross-cultural
8 We are hesitant to think that everything is equal between Paradigms and the four other proposed core beliefs.
There is a special concern with Paradigms, for with this proposed core belief in particular we seem to be able
to conceive of it being false, but perhaps this is too fast. There are worries about whether irrealism is really
coherent. Stroud (2000) says, ‘it [is] a necessary condition of our acknowledging the presence in the world of
perceptions of and beliefs about the colors of things that we believe that some objects are colored’ (p. 157).
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research into philosophical color concepts is known to us. Do people the world over agree
on color core beliefs? Future research could translate our items into different languages and
test them in non-English speaking countries. We encourage that this work be done but
cannot do it here.
3. Our method does not allow us to determine whether participants understand the
items in the way philosophers would. This said, it should be recognized that philosophers
do not agree on precise ways to understand the core beliefs. For example, regarding
Explanation, what is the nature of causal explanation? Does Hume’s Dictum that the
relata must be distinct apply (Allen 2016, p. 100–101)? Regarding Revelation, what
exactly is it to be an intrinsic nature? Is it just the intrinsic and necessary properties of
something, or is it something stronger, the essential properties of something, where this
requires a more fine-grained notion than necessity (Fine 1994)? Roberts (2018) uses
‘intrinsic nature’ to mean what something is most fundamentally.We could go on, but the
point should be clear: there is no one precise understanding available. This is why we
chose to approach participant understanding in an inclusive fashion: if they said they
understood the items, we accepted that as a minimally sufficient condition. The present
experiment provides a starting place for future experiments that may take amore stringent
approach. For example, in-depth interviews could be conducted with fewer participants
and then thematically analyzed to determine precisely how participants understand each
item.9
Relevance of Results to the Ontology of Color Our goal in this section is not to do much
heavy philosophical work but to more survey plausible consequences our results could
have for the ontology of color given Johnston’s meta-methodology of how to adjudicate
between competing ontological views on color. We focus on Experiment 2 for simplicity
and because it is the more rigorous of the two (remember that the studies largely agreed
with each other).
As Paradigms is ranked the highest, it is (ceteris paribus) the best candidate for being a
core belief.10 If Paradigms is a core belief, the colors can only not be instantiated by objects
more or less inclusively speaking. Our finding that people are generally realist about color is
consistent with Roberts and Schmidtke’s (2016) study. They asked participants to read a
vignette involving a disagreement about the color of an object and then indicate their
agreementwith (among other things) the following: ‘the object really has a color (or colors).’
They found very high agreement with this itemwith amean of 8.6 on a 10-point likert scale.
Importantly, notice their use of the word ‘really,’ which presumably tracks realism even
tighter. An empirically backed argument from intuition/common sense is available for color
realism given the two studies mentioned. Intuition/common sense should not be overturned
without significant reason.We have empirical evidence that realism is the intuitive/common
sense view. So, realism should be assumed the default position only to be overturned in light
of significant arguments to the contrary (for discussion of realism/irrealism see Hardin 1993,
9 We avoid engaging with meta-philosophical concerns about the value of intuitions in philosophy and/or
metaphysics (for this debate see Ladyman and Ross 2007, Dorr 2010, and Maclaurin and Dyke 2012).
10 The vast majority by far agreed with the Paradigm items but not everyone. Potentially some disagreed
because they took ‘some’ in, for example, ‘Some tomatoes are red’ to mean ‘only some.’ Logically ‘some’
does not mean ‘only some,’ but of course this does not mean that some participants did not read the item this
way. As some may have disagreed for this reason, we cannot assume that those who disagreed endorse
irrealism.
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2004;Mclaughlin 2003; Chalmers 2006; andByrne andHilbert 2007a).More generally, and
as previously mentioned in the introduction, there is no reason this paper cannot
be viewed as providing an empirical basis for an argument from common sense
or intuition for views which better accommodate the content of Johnston’s core
beliefs.
Explanation is the weakest core belief, according to our results, with only 59%
agreeing, compared to Revelation with 79% agreeing.11 Thus, there is reason to think
Johnston was wrong to prefer Explanation over Revelation (notice that this would also
hold if Revelation and Explanation were statistically the same, as was the case with
Experiment 1). So, if core beliefs are to adjudicate between views on color, perhaps
philosophers should consider giving up the idea that colors cause our color experiences,
in favor of a primitivist view whereby the physical realizers of primitive color properties
cause our experiences.12 More generally, our results suggest that overdetermination
arguments against higher-level views, such as primitivist and appearance dispositionalist
views, may not be as strong as thought. Our data also supports the claim that Unity is a
significantly stronger candidate (90% agreeing) for a core belief than Explanation
(ceteris paribus). Lower-level physical views, such as micro-structuralism and reflec-
tance physicalism, are known to struggle with Unity more than higher-level views
(Johnston 1992; Hardin 1993, p. 66; Maund 1995, p. 126–133; Thompson 1995, p.
124; Pautz 2006). On the other hand, higher-level views are known to struggle more
with Explanation than lower-level views (Johnston 1992; Hardin 1993, p. 61; Kim
1993a, 1993b; Tye 2000, p. 148). Which type of view is better? Our results suggest that
we should prefer Unity over Explanation, and hence that higher-level views, such as
appearance dispositionalism and primitivism, are preferable (ceteris paribus) to lower-
level physical views, such as micro-structuralism and reflectance physicalism.
Availability is the second strongest core belief, according to our results, with 91%
agreeing. This is reason to think that Johnston (1992) was right to worry about lower-
level views, such as micro-structuralism and reflectance physicalism, accommodating
Availability. As we said, Johnston’s argument runs thus: if the colors were physical
properties which accommodate Unity, we could only know that there were colors if we
knew that there were Unity accommodating physical properties, but we cannot know this
without a scientific investigation (pp. 238–238). Neither rejecting Unity nor Availability is a
good strategy to avoid this argument given our results for both are highly agreedwith. Aswe
said, Availability alone poses a problem for lower-level physical views on color: such
properties do not have the property of being such that justified belief about them is available
simply based on visual perception, but then by Leibniz’s law neither do the colors, if the
colors are physical properties (Jackson 2012). Of course, this argument is going to be
controversial.We are just surveying the types of issuesAvailability raises. Further discussion
is better left for a separate article.
Unity is the third strongest core belief after Availability, according to our results,
with 90% agreeing. So, a plausible case can be made that any view which can be said to
11 This might be seen as consistent with Roberts et al.’s (2016) finding to the effect that the causal condition on
perception is not a conceptual truth. They found that for certain cases (non-blocker cases) many lay people did
not seem to think that it was required to perceive something that the thing be a cause of the perception.
12 Johnston (1992, note 12) worries that Explanation is a prerequisite for the colors being visible properties. In
reply, empty space neither reflects nor emits light, but it seems we do visually represent it. So, more needs to
be said for Johnston’s worry to be convincing. This is not something we can discuss further in this paper.
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be a view on color must hold onto Unity. As we said, the lower-level views
micro-structuralism and reflectance physicalism are known to struggle with
Unity. Thus, there is good reason in particular to be concerned about these
views. It seems plausible that these views cannot just bite the bullet and reject
Unity if they are to remain views on color. Many proponents of micro-
structuralism and reflectance physicalism, of course, understand the importance
of Unity and try to accommodate it in various ways (Pautz 2006). However,
some views purposefully reject Unity. For example, Cohen’s relationalism
(Cohen 2004, 2009) is purposefully designed so that everyone is right in
variation cases (cases where there is perceptual disagreement about the color
of an object).13 Unity includes in it that certain colors exclude each other: if
something is entirely blue, then it cannot at the same time be entirely yellow.
In fact, it is this element of Unity about which participants indicated the
strongest agreement (see Appendix A). Thus, our results pose a problem for
Cohen’s relationalism: as it rejects Unity, in fact, the strongest element of
Unity, can it be said to even be a view on color? Perhaps not.14
Revelation is the most contentious of the core beliefs proposed by Johnston with many
different interpretations of it discussed (Byrne and Hilbert 2007b; Kalderon 2007; Gert
2008; Campbell 2005; Allen 2011; Roberts 2018). Our items were just meant to capture
Revelation as a somewhat amorphous and imprecise notion. Future work could attempt to
empirically test the separate versions of revelation proposed in the literature (Roberts
2018). Revelation, amorphously understood, is not, given our results, a particularly strong
core belief comparatively speaking: taking the composite of the 6 Experiment 2 items, it is
the weakest candidate besides Explanation. This said, our results are that a large majority
of people (79%) agree with Revelation. Looking at the individual items, we find that for
every item the majority of people agree with it (see Appendix A) and so that people agree
is a robust finding that is not easily dismissed. Benbaji (2016) rightly discounted Reve-
lation as being question begging. At that time, there was no independent motivation for
Revelation but only the opinions of Benbaji’s opposition. Our results provide some
independent motivation. Hence, future work should engage with Revelation more
seriously and cannot simply discount it as question begging.
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